Humaniora editorial
Open AccessOA2023
A Bargaining-Theoretic Approach to Moral Uncertainty
This paper formalizes the parliamentary approach to moral uncertainty by applying the Nash bargaining solution, and compares it with a structurally adjusted version of the maximize expected choiceworthiness (MEC) approach.
H. Greaves; Owen Cotton-Barrattยท Journal of Moral Philosophyยท 2023ยท DOI 10.1163/17455243-20233810
The core problem
The paper addresses the problem of decision-making under moral uncertainty, where an agent is unsure which moral theory is correct. Existing approaches include the 'maximise expected choiceworthiness' (MEC) approach and the 'my favourite theory' approach. Bostrom and others have proposed a 'parliamentary approach' analogy, where moral theories are like delegates in a parliament who bargain and vote to reach decisions. However, this approach is underspecified. The paper aims to make it precise by focusing on bargaining alone and applying the Nash solution from bargaining theory.
Innovation
The authors model moral uncertainty as a bargaining situation, setting aside voting. They apply the Nash bargaining solution, which is standard in bargaining theory. The Nash solution selects a unique outcome based on certain axioms (e.g., Pareto efficiency, symmetry, independence of irrelevant alternatives). The model treats each moral theory as a bargainer with its own utility function (choiceworthiness according to that theory). The disagreement point is presumably the outcome if no agreement is reached, which might be some default option. The paper also considers a version of MEC that employs a structural approach to intertheoretic comparisons, which involves comparing choiceworthiness across theories based on structural features.
Introduction
The paper addresses the problem of decision-making under moral uncertainty, where an agent is unsure which moral theory is correct. Existing approaches include the 'maximise expected choiceworthiness' (MEC) approach and the 'my favourite theory' approach. Bostrom and others have proposed a 'parliamentary approach' analogy, where moral theories are like delegates in a parliament who bargain and vote to reach decisions. However, this approach is underspecified. The paper aims to make it precise by focusing on bargaining alone and applying the Nash solution from bargaining theory.
Why it matters
The paper compares the bargaining-theoretic approach and the structurally adjusted MEC. Both seem to avoid objections and perform well. The authors suggest that further work is needed to determine which is superior. They highlight that the parliamentary approach, when formalized via Nash bargaining, is a viable alternative to MEC, but MEC with structural comparisons is also plausible. The key differences lie in how intertheoretic comparisons are made and how disagreement points are set.
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