Ekonomi & Bisnis editorial
Open AccessOA2025
Algorithmic Governance and Quasi-Employment: A Comparative Study of Labor Models on Meituan and Didi in the Platform Economy
This study examines how algorithmic scheduling on Meituan and Didi creates quasi-employment relationships characterized by high flexibility but also high uncertainty, reduced autonomy, and economic dependency. It highlights structural contradictions in platform labor and offers insights for policy and worker protection.
Silvanna Kuangยท Advances in Economics and Management Researchยท 2025ยท DOI 10.56028/aemr.15.1.731.2025
The core problem
The rapid expansion of the platform economy has introduced new forms of labor relations, characterized by algorithmic scheduling and flexible employment, which are reshaping traditional labor market structures and analytical frameworks. This paper investigates the formation mechanisms, economic consequences, and institutional responses to quasi-employment relationships from a labor economics perspective. It focuses on two leading Chinese platforms: Meituan (food delivery) and Didi (ride-hailing). The study aims to understand how algorithmic governance affects workers' autonomy, income stability, and career development, and to identify the structural contradictions embedded in platform labor. The research contributes to the discourse on labor policy and worker protection in the digital economy.
Innovation
The study employs a comparative case study approach, analyzing Meituan and Didi as representative platforms in the food delivery and ride-hailing sectors. It draws on secondary data sources, including platform reports, academic literature, and industry analyses, to examine the labor models and algorithmic management practices. The comparative design allows for identifying commonalities and differences in task characteristics, management structures, and worker outcomes. The authors acknowledge limitations such as the narrow focus on two platforms and reliance on secondary data, but argue that the findings provide a theoretical and empirical foundation for future research.
Introduction
The rapid expansion of the platform economy has introduced new forms of labor relations, characterized by algorithmic scheduling and flexible employment, which are reshaping traditional labor market structures and analytical frameworks. This paper investigates the formation mechanisms, economic consequences, and institutional responses to quasi-employment relationships from a labor economics perspective. It focuses on two leading Chinese platforms: Meituan (food delivery) and Didi (ride-hailing). The study aims to understand how algorithmic governance affects workers' autonomy, income stability, and career development, and to identify the structural contradictions embedded in platform labor. The research contributes to the discourse on labor policy and worker protection in the digital economy.
Why it matters
The study highlights the structural contradictions embedded in platform labor. On one hand, platforms offer flexibility and income opportunities; on the other, algorithmic control and economic dependency undermine worker autonomy and security. The quasi-employment relationship blurs the boundaries between employment and self-employment, challenging traditional labor regulations. The authors argue that current institutional responses are inadequate and propose that labor policies need to adapt to the digital economy by addressing algorithmic transparency, income stability, and social protection for platform workers. The comparative analysis of Meituan and Didi shows that despite sectoral differences, the core mechanisms of algorithmic governance and their consequences are similar, suggesting the need for cross-sectoral policy solutions. Future research should include international comparisons, cross-sector platform analysis, and long-term tracking of platform workers' career trajectories.
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