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Open AccessOA2025
Contractualist Moral Cognition: From the Normative to the Descriptive at Three Levels of Analysis
Contractualist moral theories, which view morality as mutually beneficial agreements among rational agents, offer a fruitful lens for understanding moral cognition. This review presents five reasons for adopting this framework and examines its application at three interrelated levels: evolutionary logic, cognitive organization, and specific reasoning processes.
Arthur Le Pargneux· Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science· 2025· DOI 10.1002/wcs.70011
The core problem
Contractualist moral theories conceptualize morality as a system of mutually beneficial agreements among rational agents. While consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics have long dominated moral philosophy and its empirical investigation, contractualism has only recently begun to attract attention in the cognitive science of morality. This article asks whether adopting a contractualist lens can fruitfully advance our understanding of how moral cognition works. The author first introduces the main contractualist theories in contemporary moral philosophy and then presents five reasons to take inspiration from this family of normative theories to develop descriptive accounts of morality. The review then examines how the contractualist framework has been used to contribute to our understanding of moral cognition at three interrelated levels of analysis: morality's evolutionary logic, its cognitive organization, and the specific cognitive processes and forms of reasoning involved in moral judgment and decision making.
Innovation
This work is a theoretical review that synthesizes literature from moral philosophy, evolutionary biology, cognitive science, and behavioral economics. The methodology involves: (1) identifying core contractualist theories in normative ethics; (2) articulating five reasons why these theories can inspire descriptive accounts of moral cognition; and (3) organizing empirical and theoretical findings at three levels of analysis. At the evolutionary level, the review examines accounts that explain morality's evolutionary logic in contractualist terms. At the cognitive level, it discusses resource-rational contractualism, which proposes that subcomponents of moral cognition—including rule- and outcome-based mechanisms and agreement-based processes—are organized to efficiently approximate the outcome of explicit negotiation under resource constraints. At the process level, it reviews empirical evidence on three characteristically contractualist forms of reasoning: virtual bargaining, we-reasoning, and universalization. The review does not involve new empirical data collection but rather integrates existing research to propose a third way for the cognitive science of morality, beyond the traditional distinction between rules and consequences.
Introduction
Contractualist moral theories conceptualize morality as a system of mutually beneficial agreements among rational agents. While consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics have long dominated moral philosophy and its empirical investigation, contractualism has only recently begun to attract attention in the cognitive science of morality. This article asks whether adopting a contractualist lens can fruitfully advance our understanding of how moral cognition works. The author first introduces the main contractualist theories in contemporary moral philosophy and then presents five reasons to take inspiration from this family of normative theories to develop descriptive accounts of morality. The review then examines how the contractualist framework has been used to contribute to our understanding of moral cognition at three interrelated levels of analysis: morality's evolutionary logic, its cognitive organization, and the specific cognitive processes and forms of reasoning involved in moral judgment and decision making.
Why it matters
The reviewed research programs open a third way for the cognitive science of morality, one based on agreement rather than solely on rules or consequences. This contractualist lens offers several advantages: it can integrate seemingly disparate findings on rule- and outcome-based moral judgments by showing how they serve the overarching goal of approximating mutually beneficial agreements; it highlights the role of understudied processes such as virtual bargaining and we-reasoning; and it provides a natural bridge between normative and descriptive theorizing. However, challenges remain, including the need for more direct empirical evidence on agreement-based processes and the development of computational models that specify how resource-rational contractualism operates. The author concludes that adopting a contractualist perspective is fruitful for understanding moral cognition and suggests that future research should further explore the cognitive mechanisms underlying virtual bargaining, we-reasoning, and universalization, as well as their neural and developmental bases.
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