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Ekonomi & Bisnis editorial

Open AccessOA2023

‘Independence’ of Central Banks and the Political Economy of Monetary Policy

This digest reviews Qanas and Sawyer's analysis of central bank independence, highlighting its alignment with the 'new consensus' and financial interests, and the shift towards broader mandates including financial stability, inequality, and climate change.
J. Qanas; M. Sawyer· Review of Political Economy· 2023· DOI 10.1080/09538259.2023.2189006

The core problem

The notion of an ‘independent’ central bank has dominated monetary policy debates for the past three decades. The arguments for the political independence of central banks are closely related to the adoption of ‘inflation targeting’. The authors, J. Qanas and M. Sawyer, critically examine the concept of central bank independence, arguing that it has been narrowly defined as independence from government but not from the influence of the ‘new consensus in macroeconomics’ or the interests of the banking and financial sector. This independence has also supported a lack of co-ordination between monetary and fiscal policies, diminishing the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies. Furthermore, doubts remain about the effectiveness of ‘inflation targeting’ in achieving low inflation. The paper sets the stage for a political economy analysis of monetary policy, questioning the conventional wisdom on central bank independence.

Innovation

The paper employs a political economy approach, likely involving a review of theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on central bank independence and inflation targeting. It critically assesses the rationale for independence, which is based on the ‘credibility’ of a ‘conservative’ central bank compared to government decision-making. The authors examine the relationship between independence, the ‘new consensus in macroeconomics’, and the influence of financial interests. They also analyze the coordination between monetary and fiscal policies and the effectiveness of inflation targeting. The methodology is qualitative, drawing on economic theory and policy analysis to deconstruct the concept of independence and its implications.
Introduction
The notion of an ‘independent’ central bank has dominated monetary policy debates for the past three decades. The arguments for the political independence of central banks are closely related to the adoption of ‘inflation targeting’. The authors, J. Qanas and M. Sawyer, critically examine the concept of central bank independence, arguing that it has been narrowly defined as independence from government but not from the influence of the ‘new consensus in macroeconomics’ or the interests of the banking and financial sector. This independence has also supported a lack of co-ordination between monetary and fiscal policies, diminishing the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies. Furthermore, doubts remain about the effectiveness of ‘inflation targeting’ in achieving low inflation. The paper sets the stage for a political economy analysis of monetary policy, questioning the conventional wisdom on central bank independence.

Why it matters

The analysis suggests that the independence of central banks is not a neutral technocratic arrangement but is embedded in a particular macroeconomic paradigm and serves specific interests. The lack of coordination between monetary and fiscal policies can lead to suboptimal outcomes, as the two policies may work at cross purposes. The doubts about inflation targeting's effectiveness call into question the primary rationale for independence. The shift in mandates towards financial stability, inequality, and climate change indicates a recognition that central banks cannot ignore broader societal issues. The authors likely argue for a rethinking of central bank independence, emphasizing democratic accountability and coordination with fiscal policy to address contemporary challenges. This discussion contributes to the political economy of monetary policy by exposing the power relations and ideological underpinnings of central bank independence.

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