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Humaniora editorial

Open AccessOA2022

Legal Positivism and the Moral Origins of Legal Systems

Legal positivists claim that legality is determined by social facts, but historical officials often treated moral principles as legally binding. Atiq argues that positivists must either explain this away or accept that their theory is parochial.
Emad H. Atiq· Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence· 2022· DOI 10.1017/cjlj.2022.17

The core problem

Legal positivism holds that the legality of a rule is fundamentally determined by social facts—such as enactment, custom, or judicial decision—rather than by its moral merits. However, for much of legal history, ordinary officials used legal terminology in ways that seem inconsistent with this view. Judges regularly cited, analyzed, and predicated their decisions on the 'laws of justice,' which they claimed had universal legal import. This practice, though well-documented by historians, has received surprisingly little philosophical attention. Emad H. Atiq argues that this historical pattern invites explanation from positivists and poses a challenge to the universality of legal positivism.

Innovation

Atiq proceeds by first taxonomizing the explanatory options available to legal positivists. He then evaluates these options, focusing on their costs and benefits. The central strategy he examines is an appeal to conceptual change: the claim that classical Romans, early modern Europeans, and founding-era Americans were not using 'law' (or 'lex' or 'jus') to refer to the same subject matter as contemporary legal philosophy. This conceptual-change strategy, Atiq argues, is the most viable option for positivists, but it comes at a significant cost.
Introduction
Legal positivism holds that the legality of a rule is fundamentally determined by social facts—such as enactment, custom, or judicial decision—rather than by its moral merits. However, for much of legal history, ordinary officials used legal terminology in ways that seem inconsistent with this view. Judges regularly cited, analyzed, and predicated their decisions on the 'laws of justice,' which they claimed had universal legal import. This practice, though well-documented by historians, has received surprisingly little philosophical attention. Emad H. Atiq argues that this historical pattern invites explanation from positivists and poses a challenge to the universality of legal positivism.

Why it matters

Atiq's argument has important implications for legal philosophy. It suggests that legal positivism may be a theory of a particular historical and cultural context rather than a universal account of the nature of law. The historical practice of citing 'laws of justice' as legally binding indicates that officials in the past may have held a different concept of law—one that inherently included moral principles. If so, positivism's insistence on the separation of law and morality may reflect a modern conceptual shift rather than a timeless truth. This raises questions about the methodology of legal philosophy and the extent to which contemporary theories can be projected onto the past. Atiq concludes that positivists must either provide a convincing explanation of the historical evidence or accept the parochial nature of their theory.

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