Jadwal Sholat

Memuat jadwal sholatโ€ฆ

Humaniora editorial

Open AccessOA2022

The Phenomenology of Moral Intuition

Audi distinguishes episodic intuitive seemings from moral judgments, comparing intuition to perception and arguing that intuitions are discriminative responses to experience with justificatory power akin to sense-perception.
R. Audiยท Ethical Theory and Moral Practiceยท 2022ยท DOI 10.1007/s10677-021-10245-w

The core problem

Moral judgment commonly depends on intuition, and ethical theory also depends on it, though this is less widely agreed. The nature and epistemic status of intuition have long concerned philosophy, and with the rise of ethical intuitionism as a major position, they are receiving much attention. There is growing agreement that intuition, conceived as a kind of seeming, is essential for both the justification of moral judgment and the confirmation of ethical theories. This paper describes several importantly different kinds of intuition, particularly episodic kinds often called seemings, by sketching numerous examples. Intuitive seemings and moral judgments based on them differ in content, basis, epistemic authority, and phenomenology. The paper explores these four dimensions and compares moral intuition with moral perception. The overall aim is to clarify moral phenomenology both descriptively and epistemologically and to support the view that intuitions are often discriminative responses to experience and have justificatory power analogous to that of sense-perceptions.

Innovation

The paper employs a phenomenological and epistemological approach. It proceeds by describing and analyzing examples of intuition to distinguish different kinds of intuition, especially episodic seemings. The method involves comparing intuitive seemings with moral judgments based on them across four dimensions: content, basis, epistemic authority, and phenomenology. It also compares moral intuition with moral perception to clarify similarities and differences. The analysis is conceptual and descriptive, aiming to clarify moral phenomenology and support the epistemic status of intuition as justificatory.
Introduction
Moral judgment commonly depends on intuition, and ethical theory also depends on it, though this is less widely agreed. The nature and epistemic status of intuition have long concerned philosophy, and with the rise of ethical intuitionism as a major position, they are receiving much attention. There is growing agreement that intuition, conceived as a kind of seeming, is essential for both the justification of moral judgment and the confirmation of ethical theories. This paper describes several importantly different kinds of intuition, particularly episodic kinds often called seemings, by sketching numerous examples. Intuitive seemings and moral judgments based on them differ in content, basis, epistemic authority, and phenomenology. The paper explores these four dimensions and compares moral intuition with moral perception. The overall aim is to clarify moral phenomenology both descriptively and epistemologically and to support the view that intuitions are often discriminative responses to experience and have justificatory power analogous to that of sense-perceptions.

Why it matters

The paper discusses the implications of these findings for moral phenomenology and epistemology. It argues that recognizing the distinct nature of intuitive seemings helps clarify how moral judgments are justified. The comparison with moral perception supports the view that intuitions are not mere feelings but cognitive responses to experience that can justify beliefs. The discussion also addresses the epistemic authority of intuition, suggesting that it is analogous to sense-perception in its justificatory role. Overall, the paper supports ethical intuitionism by showing that intuitions, as seemings, are essential for moral justification and theory confirmation.

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